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In this paper we investigate the impact of firms’ pricing policies upon
entry and welfare under duopoly price competition and product differ-
entiation. We consider a model where an incumbent serves two distinct
and independent geographical markets and an entrant may enter in one
of the markets. Our results show that discriminatory pricing may be
either more, less or equally favorable to entry than uniform pricing. The
welfare effect of banning price discrimination is also ambiguous.
However, the case for banning price discrimination is much weaker than
under monopoly. Interestingly, discriminatory pricing may yield higher
welfare even when entry occurs only under uniform pricing.
1 I
There are many circumstances where firms are not allowed to price discrim-
inate. For instance, cross-market price restrictions are often part of universal
service requirements (such as postal delivery, railroad transport, telecommu-
nications and gas markets).1 Similarly, in anti-dumping legislation firms are
not allowed to price discriminate across countries (see Prusa, 1994). There are
also examples of firms using non-discriminatory prices, such as in pharma-
ceutical markets where global reference pricing is common (see Lanjouw,
1997) and in most-favored-costumer rules (for Medicaid, liquor and lead-
based antiknock compounds markets in USA, see, respectively, Scott
Morton, 1997; Degraba, 1987; Hay, 1994).
Therefore an important economic policy issue is whether price discrim-
ination should be prohibited or not. To answer this question one should not
limit the analysis to a comparison between uniform pricing and discrimina-
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1In the late 20th century, there was regulation on the British telecommunications market in terms
of the local and long-distance call charges and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(1988) removed the freedom to discriminate in the British gas market.
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